This article addresses the confluence of two phenomena characterizing litigation in the United States Supreme Court. The Solicitor General represents the United States in the Court, and the SG has been extraordinarily successful as a litigant, and in supporting other successful litigants through the filing of amicus curiae briefs. Likewise, many interest groups, and the United States and state governments, have increasingly filed amicus briefs in Court cases. The SG participates as a party or an amicus in well over half of the cases decided on the merits by the Court, especially significant given the Court's shrunken docket in recent decades. The Court often cites the SG's amicus briefs, and requests the SG to file such briefs at the certiorari and merits stages. Given the high quality of the SG's work in general, and the apparent helpfulness of the SG's amicus briefs, many observers seem to approve of the status quo, and applaud the SG filing numerous amicus briefs, and their influence on the Court.
INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the confluence of two phenomena characterizing a significant portion of litigation in the United States Supreme Court (the "Court") in recent decades. The Solicitor General ("SG") represents the interests of the United States in the Court, and the SG has been extraordinarily successful as a litigant, and in supporting other successful litigants through the filing of friend-of-the-court, or amicus curiae, briefs. 1 Likewise, many interest groups, and the United States and state governments, have increasingly filed amicus briefs in Court cases.
2 Every Term of the Court seems to present a case vying for the most amicus briefs ever filed. In the 2011 Term, that case was the constitutional challenge to the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 3 with 136 amicus briefs filed. 4 The SG participates as representing a party or appearing as amicus in well over half of the cases decided on the merits by the Court, 5 especially significant given the Court's shrunken docket of recent decades. 6 The Court should generally file amicus briefs only in cases involving foreign affairs, national security, where the executive branch and federal agencies are expressly given authority to enforce federal law, and a few other areas of direct federal interest. The article next examines the deference sometimes given the SG's amicus briefs by the Court. The influence of the SG's amicus briefs goes beyond mere statistical correlation between the position advocated by the SG and the holding of the Court. The Court often calls for the views of the SG ("CVSG") via amicus briefs, frequently cites or discusses the SG amicus brief, disproportionately more than other amicus briefs, and sometimes individual Justices will even lament that their decision making has been hindered by the failure of the SG to file an amicus brief. 12 But the Court has not been consistent regarding the doctrinal deference it generally gives the SG's briefs, particularly in certain categories of cases. 13 In other cases the Court sometimes goes out of its way to criticize the SG's brief, or simply ignores it, or treats it the same way it treats other amicus briefs.
14 Using as examples SG amicus briefs filed in recent Terms, the article 12. BLACK & OWENS, supra note 1, at 51-54; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 , 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (declining to modify personal jurisdiction doctrine "without a better understanding of the relevant contemporary commercial circumstances . . . [as] they might be presented in a case (unlike the present one) in which the Solicitor General participates") (referring to amicus brief filed by SG in a companion case). It is worth noting that Justice Breyer "has been an outspoken advocate of the informational benefits of amicus participation in particularly complex areas of law and in questions that implicate technical or scientific issues." Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247 REV. , 1253 REV. (2011 (footnote omitted). See also Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 586 (7th Cir. 2012 ) (Ripple, J., concurring) (arguing that consideration of case regarding preemption of state property law by recently-enacted federal law would have benefited from the amicus curiae participation of the United States, given the "public importance" of the private litigation).
13. Compare, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 , 1321 n.10 (2011 (observing that Court's holding "accords with the views of the SEC" as indicated by the SG's amicus brief, and noting that the SEC's views of the securities law issues are "entitled to consideration" (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976) )), and Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 , 1201 -02 (2013 (giving weight to SG's amicus brief expressing views of the Department of Justice and the SEC), with Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 , 2303 n.8 (2011 (declining to address issue raised by the SEC via the SG's amicus brief, and noting that "we have previously expressed skepticism over the degree to which the SEC should receive deference regarding" the existence and scope of private rights of action under the securities laws, with no reference to Matrixx, decided over two months earlier).
14. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 , 2824 (discussing "flaws" in the SG's amicus brief); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 , 2886 -88 (2010 (devoting entire subsection of opinion to refuting position advanced in SG's amicus brief); Already, L.L. C. v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 732-33 (2013) (same); Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 , 1078 -81 (2013 (same) . See generally infra Part III. A. proposes and applies criteria to constrain the SG in filing such briefs, and to guide the Court in determining how much deference, if any, to give such briefs in certain cases. The Court can and should consider the views of the SG as amicus in any case, but it should only give deference to the briefs filed in cases involving certain aspects of foreign affairs and other areas where the executive branch possesses expertise on legal or relevant facts.
One may question why this effort is necessary. The SG's office across different Presidential administrations enjoys a deservedly high reputation for almost all of its amicus work, legal probity, usefulness to the Court, and impartiality of the briefs. Moreover, some have argued that the Court does and should take into account the political signals and public opinion transmitted by the SG and interest groups in amicus briefs. 15 Why not leave well enough alone? The short answer is that there is much truth to these assertions, but a good thing has been taken too far. There is too much activism by the SG in filing amicus briefs, an activism which cloaks the sometimes politicized nature of the decision to file, or not file, such briefs. The inconsistent deference by the Court to such briefs, when they are filed, has been a source of doctrinal confusion. More generally, the critics of too many amicus curiae briefs argue that it undermines the adversary system, and the SG's frequent filing of such briefs plays into that criticism. 16 It may be unfair to the disfavored litigant for the SG to weigh in as amicus unless the interests of the United States are directly implicated. A more restrained role by the SG in filing such briefs, and more consistency by the Supreme Court in deferring (if at all) to them, will inure to the benefit of both institutions. REV. 583, 588-89 (2005) (arguing that elected officials may sometimes welcome Supreme Court intervention to overcome political opposition, and giving example of Kennedy administration filing amicus briefs in reapportionment cases).
16. E.g., Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-37 (2011) (arguing that the Court's frequent reference to information in amicus briefs undermines the adversarial system). For further discussion, see infra Parts II.A, II.D.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the increasing filing of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court in all cases by many interest groups, and by the SG in particular. This part also considers reasons for the SG's success as amicus, the controversies that have occasionally attended the SG's filing of amicus briefs in abortion, school prayer, and other controversial cases, and suggests criteria that the SG should follow in filing amicus briefs with a narrower vision of the interests of the United States. Part III focuses on the use of such briefs by the Supreme Court. It begins by canvassing recent examples of the Court explicitly deferring to, relying on without deference as such, or disagreeing with, the position advanced by the SG. Drawing on administrative law principles, this part considers why the Court should ever defer in any case to a position advanced by the SG as amicus and, if so, what those categories of cases should be. Part IV concludes the article.
II. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS AMICUS CURIAE

A. Amicus Briefs in General
The filing of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court is mainly a creature of the second half of the twentieth century. 17 Amicus briefs, or their functional equivalent, were first filed in the Court as early as 1823, but the Court formally institutionalized the practice by promulgating rules in 1939. 18 The rules require any person, interest group, or governmental entity to seek the permission of the parties or of the Court itself to file such briefs, save for the SG or state attorneys general, where no permission is needed. 19 In recent decades, all of these entities have increasingly filed amicus briefs in the Court, so much so that the vast majority of cases decided on the merits have at least one amicus brief filed. 20 Similarly, the Justices themselves are cognizant of the large number of amicus briefs filed, and have themselves increasingly cited or discussed such briefs in their 17. For overviews of the history of the filing of and use of amicus curiae briefs in the Court, see generally EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (9th ed. opinions. 21 Numerous reasons have been advanced for the proliferation of amicus briefs, including the Court's liberally granting leaves to file the briefs, more interest groups paying attention to Court decisions, groups filing briefs to counter those filed by competing groups, and the perception of groups that the briefs can impact Court decisions.
22
The rising tide and apparent influence of amicus briefs has not been without controversy. Originally, most amicus briefs were indeed thought to be friends of the court, not of the parties, and brought useful, disinterested arguments and information to a court's attention, in ways the parties would not or could not. 23 That's still true, and the value added by amicus briefs to the information flowing to the Court provides the most powerful justification for the filing and use of the briefs. 24 But it soon became apparent that many if not most amicus briefs were advocating a particular result, usually on behalf of one of the parties.
25 And many such briefs came to be filed by interest groups which routinely lobbied the other branches of government on public policy. 26 The political aura of these briefs, as part of the process that leads to ostensibly non-political and non-ideological 25. Krislov, supra note 23, at 702-04. 26. The classic treatment of the shift in the nature of amicus briefs is Samuel Krislov, supra note 24. The shift is reflected in the Supreme Court's rules, which request that the brief on "its cover shall identify the party supported or indicate whether it suggests affirmance or reversal." SUP. CT. R. 37.3(a) . Justices now routinely refer in opinions to a party and his or her amici. E.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 1564 -67 (2013 ; Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 , 2173 n.24 (2012 ; Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2012) ; Haw, supra note 12, at 1258 n.66 (giving other examples). Some argue that amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, the first of which were filed in the antebellum era, have never "acted as solely neutral bystanders; instead, the partisan role of the amicus has always been the norm." COLLINS, supra note 17, at 40. judicial decisions, has led some observers to call for limits to 27 or even the banning of amicus briefs. 28 Amicus briefs have been a matter of some controversy at the Supreme Court. While the Court's own rules permit the filing of such briefs, some Justices have privately worried that amicus briefs may present factual or legal issues irrelevant to the case as shaped by the adversarial parties.
29
Justice Felix Frankfurter argued that the new rules provided a tooconvenient conduit for interest groups to lobby, which, he felt, could do damage to the image of the Court by suggesting that the Court was susceptible to such pressures. 30 Subsequently, some Justices have occasionally criticized in opinions the arguments in or usefulness of information found in particular amicus briefs, 31 but none has launched a systematic attack on the institution of the amicus brief. Quite the contrary, now all of the Justices frequently cite or distinguish such briefs.
32
B. Solicitor General Success and Influence as Amicus Curiae
What is meant by the success and influence of the SG when filing amicus curiae briefs in the Court? Hard data provides one answer. As observed at the outset, the Court supports the SG at high levels, both when the SG represents the United States as a party, and supports a party as an amicus. 33 The latter role is the primary focus of this article, and ample 27. The most prominent critic has been Judge Richard Posner, who has argued that permission to file amicus briefs should not be granted when they are only used to signal political preferences to a court. See, e.g., Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) ; Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062 , 1063 (7th Cir. 1997 Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 632 (1974) . Kurland described this "lobbying" of the Court as "unseemly" and argued it should be eliminated. Id. For an overview of the criticisms of amicus briefs, see Simmons, supra note 9, at 326-33.
29. Gorod, supra note 16, at 36 n.154 (discussing debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1946 -O.T. 1961 , 1980 .
30. See Hutchinson, supra note 29, at 162. 31. E.g., Gorod, supra note 16, at 37 (giving an example of criticizing the majority's reliance on an amicus brief).
32. See supra note 2. 33. See supra note 1. When the United States or an agency thereof is a party or appears as amicus, almost always the SG is the lead attorney. Sometimes the attorneys for that particular agency, rather than the SG, may appear before the Court or file an amicus brief. For convenience, all such instances will be referenced as the SG filing on behalf of the United States. For purposes of this discussion it is unnecessary to further differentiate these roles because it is relatively rare for the SG not to represent the United States and on the few occasions it does happen, the other attorneys usually consult the SG before filing a brief. Paul evidence from nearly five decades supports the proposition that the Court frequently agrees with the recommendation of the SG, no matter the political affiliation of the President who appointed the SG, both regarding whether certiorari should be granted, 34 and the disposition of the case on the merits, once review is granted. 35 Beyond such data, which focus on the outcomes of cases, the SG's amicus briefs are also often considered to be influential in the shaping of doctrine by the Court as revealed in opinions. That influence may be revealed by citations to the SG's amicus brief in the Court's opinions, 36 or the Court can simply take into account the arguments or positions of the SG without citing to the SG's amicus brief. Solicitor General, 1953 -2002 , 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 253, 266 (2003 37. As is often observed, merely because an amicus brief is cited does not mean it was particularly influential, and no citation does not mean it wasn't influential. For prominent examples of the latter phenomenon, consider Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 38 The Court frequently follows the suggestion of the SG in this regard.
39
What accounts for the success of the SG as amicus? The conventional answer is that the SG's office brings considerable expertise to the briefs it files, enjoying a bi-partisan reputation for excellence and credibility built up over decades of many administrations, given the SG's status as a classic repeat player in the Court with financial and other resources unavailable to most litigants. 40 Many distinguished lawyers have served as the SG, and many have gone on to serve in the federal judiciary (including the Supreme Court) or in other high-profile positions in the legal profession. 41 It is an elite legal institution within the federal government, and the SG draws on that reservoir of reputation and acumen when drafting amicus briefs, as no doubt do the readers of the briefs on (and off) 42 the Court. SUPREME COURT 163-64 (2012) ("In an age when the reputations of many government agencies have suffered, the office of the solicitor general has remained a symbol of excellence: small, elite, and deeply respected by its most important audience, the justices.") with the policy preferences of the Court or individual Justices; that the positions taken by such briefs are influenced by the perceived reception by the Court; or that the Court is deferring to the position taken by the SG for the political support it may offer. 44 It takes no great insight to conclude that these various explanations are not mutually exclusive, and probably some or all of them are at work in any given case, or in the overall work of any given SG.
45
C.
The 's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946 -1960 : An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987 The amicus curiae filings of the SGs in the Reagan administration attracted particular attention and criticism in some quarters. That administration took a stronger interest than past ones in using the amicus filings of the SG to advance a conservative social policy agenda. 51 Rex Lee and Charles Fried, the Solicitor Generals under Reagan, filed briefs in several high-profile cases arguing, among other things, in favor of school prayer, against abortion rights, and against racial preferences on behalf of minorities. 52 The purported amicus activism of the Reagan SGs was attended by an upsurge in scholarly discussion of the proper role of the SG.
53
Some argued that the SG as amicus should be in effect a "Tenth Justice," serving to protect the institutional interests of the Court, without regard to and indeed independent of the policy agenda of a particular administration. Under this vision, the SG is uniquely positioned to provide the Court with valuable and unbiased legal arguments and information regarding the 49. The Kennedy administration filed amicus briefs in support of the Court's decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) , holding that reapportionment cases were not nonjusticiable political questions, and in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) , and its companion cases, applying the one-person, one-vote standard to determine the constitutionality of the population of districts. For a discussion of the SG's briefs in these and other reapportionment cases, see Solimine, supra note 37, at 1120-30. See also PACELLE, supra note 46, at 81-88 (discussing SG amicus briefs filed in Kennedy administration).
50. PACELLE, supra note 46, at 93-141 (discussing SG amicus briefs filed in racial discrimination cases in the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations).
51. For general discussions of the amicus activity of the SGs in the Reagan administration, see PACELLE, supra note 46, at 144-69; REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 134-45 (1992) . For the views of the SGs in the Reagan administration regarding the advancement of the social policy of the administration, see Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 599 (1986) 53. For an excellent overview of the scholarly debate generated during and in the wake of the SG's amicus filings in the Reagan administration, see Cordray & Cordray, supra note 5, at 1360-66. practical effect of decisions. 54 A second model posited that the SG should be an advocate for the federal government as an institution. Under this view, the SG should not advocate for either the Court itself or the Presidency, but rather for the federal government as a whole. This would suggest that pursuing a broader policy agenda with amicus briefs should not be given a high priority. 55 Finally, a third model suggested that the SG as a Presidential appointee is indeed the voice of the President, with no particular responsibilities to the Court or the federal government as a whole, and should be able to advance the legal and policy goals of the Chief Executive. 56 The last model was said, in some quarters, to be an innovation of the Reagan administration, and characterized the activism of its amicus filings. Others argued that the criticism was overblown, and that prior administrations had indeed advocated broader social policies in those briefs, albeit in a less overt way than in the 1980s.
57
Experience demonstrates that most SGs follow some mix of the models in their general activities and in their amicus filings. 58 Consider some representative examples from post-Reagan administrations. The Clinton Administration filed an amicus brief arguing against the constitutionality of a state ban on partial-birth abortion, 59 affirmative action programs in public employment and college admissions.
62
By the same token, one can easily find examples of administrations declining to file amicus briefs in high-profile cases that might have been thought to have attracted the SG's attention. 63 Indeed, two leading scholars of the Supreme Court's docket and the SG's office, Margaret and Richard Cordray, argued that the SG in recent administrations had limited its amicus participation to cases where the "federal government ha[d] a direct and important interest." 64 According to these observers, the SG had typically only filed amicus briefs in cases involving the interpretation or enforcement of federal statutes, while sitting out cases involving private arbitration agreements, bankruptcy, or maritime law.
65
While recent SGs may not especially be activists when filing amicus briefs, the Court's shrunken docket of the last two decades might suggest that the SG should not be reticent in such filings. Some argue that whatever the reasons for the smaller docket, 66 a depleted docket may leave important issues of federal law undecided, and may suggest that the Court is isolated and out of touch with the typical legal issues that affect people and are litigated in the lower courts. 67 Moreover, a depleted docket might lead to the excessive influence of a small number of parties, groups, lawyers, or law firms. 68 Indeed, it has been argued that the apparent increased influence of the SG is a prime example of this phenomenon. 69 In short, the political economy of the generation of the smaller docket suggests that the current Court, when deciding cases, receives comparatively less information from fewer players than before. In this environment, it might be argued, the SG's office should be sharing its expertise by filing more, rather than fewer, amicus briefs.
70
D. Curbing Solicitor General Activism as Amicus Curiae
If the careful assessment by the Cordrays was conclusive then there would be little need to suggest limits on the SG filing amicus briefs. While it is true that the SG has not been reckless in filing amicus briefs, in my view the SG still has been, historically and recently, too active in filing such briefs. There are several interrelated reasons that support this conclusion. The first and most important is that the SG's office has always had an overly expansive view of the "interests of the United States." In the postNew Deal world, the reach of the federal government in American society is so vast that, it would seem, there is some federal interest in virtually any case where the United States is not a party. Some SGs have attempted to cabin their discretion when filing amicus briefs. For example, Rex Lee suggested that the cases where the SG might file amicus briefs fell into two categories. The first, the "easier one" for him, consisted of cases that "involved direct federal law enforcement interests," where a private litigant was enforcing a federal statute that the executive was also authorized to enforce, or criminal cases that might impact the enforcement of federal criminal law. 71 The second category, a "harder one," were those cases involving an administration's "broader agenda," such as "abortion, obscenity, and freedom of religion." 72 The federal interest in these cases, Lee seemed to concede, was less direct, but it was nonetheless appropriate, 74. SG Brief in Wallace, supra note 52, at 2 (arguing that case will impact whether Congress has "authority to allow periods for silent prayer or meditation in schools [run by the federal government]"). The brief added that the SG had previously participated as a party or amicus in numerous Religion Clause cases. Id. SG Fried spent much of his time in oral argument in Wallace v. Jaffree discussing the purported federal interest. Cooper, supra note 46, at 694 n.102.
75. SG Brief in Stenberg, supra note 59, at 1-3 (arguing that constitutionality of state statute prohibiting partial-birth abortion impacts certain aspects of Medicaid and Medicare programs, and the constitutionality of proposed federal statutes); SG Brief in Thornburgh, supra note 52, at 1 (arguing that the Court's abortion decisions have a "direct impact upon the ability of the country's elected representatives--both state and federal--to deal with this important question of great public import and heated political debate"). Cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1208 n.127 (2012) (arguing that federal interests advanced in the latter brief were not convincing).
76. SG Brief in Wygant, supra note 52, at 1 (observing that "the government has the responsibility for enforcing numerous statutes prohibiting [racial] discrimination," and that the SG has frequently participated as party of amicus "in cases presenting constitutional and statutory claims of racial discrimination").
77 As one recent example of the latter cases, consider Turner v. Rogers, 84 where the Court held that due process requires certain procedural safeguards be followed in child support cases involving indigent defendants. The Court in its opinion drew heavily on the analysis of and recommendations found in the SG's brief, observing that the "Government draws upon considerable experience in helping to manage statutorily mandated federal-state efforts to enforce child support orders."
85 While Congress has indeed legislated in this area, 86 child support, like other family law topics, is largely governed by state law and state institutions, and seems a peripheral area of federal concern. In Turner and other cases, a federal interest is not absent, but it is so attenuated from an impact of the executive branch's enforcement of federal law so as not to justify the filing of an amicus brief. A full canvass of SG filings from earlier Terms of the Court is beyond the scope of this article. What this limited review does suggest, however, is that recent SGs have frequently filed amicus briefs in cases that approach the outer boundaries of federal governmental interests, however one might define that term.
oversee rail safety, and that there was an "interest in the proper application of this statute." Id. Notably, the Court had requested that the SG file an amicus brief. Id. at 2. A second set of reasons to curb SG activism derives from the institutional imperatives of the SG in particular, and of the executive branch in general, to file such briefs. The SG and the lawyers who work in that office are undoubtedly aware of the respected history of that office, and like any other bureaucracy, seek to protect and advance their power and prestige. 87 In this environment, it seems likely that the SG's office as a whole will not hesitate to file amicus briefs that are welcomed by and sometimes cited by the Court, even when the federal interest is not strong. More generally, the executive branch as a whole, and the President in particular, is not averse to using the SG's amicus briefs to advance policy objectives. 88 To be sure, the connection between the SG and President in this regard can be overstated. Studies demonstrate that the SG takes into account a variety of legal (e.g., the applicable legal principles and precedent), political (e.g., the policies of the President), and administrative (e.g., resources available to the SG) factors when filing amicus briefs. 89 And the SG has incentives not to excessively file amicus briefs, lest the reputation of the office be depreciated in the eyes of the Court. Nonetheless, when considered together, the history of the SG's practice in filing amicus briefs suggests that, to varying degrees, the process is or is perceived to be a political one, undermining the view that the SG as amicus is a disinterested "Tenth Justice." The filing of amicus briefs without a solid foundation from a meaningful federal interest can only exacerbate that perception. Unless there is a meaningful federal interest, the SG's position as amicus will be freighted (rightly or wrongly) with political significance. Indeed, there is evidence that the Court is less inclined to follow the recommendations of the SG as amicus, when the SG takes what are perceived to be overtly political positions, as measured by the congruence between the SG's position and the ideology of the President.
92
A third argument in favor a more modest role for the SG in filing amicus briefs is the potential for distortion of the adversarial process. The SG as amicus has a powerful influence on the Court, so the SG should take care when attempting to influence the outcome of litigation where the United States is not a party. Recently, Ryan Black and Ryan Owens have documented this extraordinary influence, and it is not due simply to the fact that the SG's office enjoys superior resources and attorney experience. When matched with the experiences at the Court of similarly credentialed and resourced attorneys, the SG still has a superior success rate. This suggests that the SG's influence is based in part on the built-in advantage of the reputation and credibility of the SG's office, which other lawyers and parties have great difficulty in matching. 93 The SG, then, can overwhelm the efforts of the legal representation of other litigants.
The prospect of disproportionate influence of the SG, as party or amicus, may be welcome to some observers, perhaps even including the Justices, if they feel the SG on the whole has earned such influence and most decisions S. CT. HIST. 75, 81-86 (2012) would benefit from that influence. But that influence, especially as a nonparty amicus, is in tension with conventional models of the adversarial process. One need not call for the abolition of amicus briefs to observe that it is an elemental aspect of due process for any case to primarily rise and fall on the efforts of the parties and their attorneys, and not depend on the efforts of amici or others outside of the litigation. 94 To put the same point another way: promoting modesty on the part of the SG in filing amicus briefs is a corollary of the pursuit of judicial modesty in resolving legal controversies. Two principal models of dispute resolution compete in American jurisprudence in general and in the federal courts in particular. The dispute resolution model posits that courts should focus on the resolution of concrete disputes by parties directly affected by the controversy, so courts will not intrude on the prerogatives of the other branches of government.
95 The law declaration model, in contrast, posits that federal courts have a special function of declaring and enforcing the law, "independent of the task of resolving concrete disputes over individual rights."
96 Amicus curiae briefs can fit comfortably within both models but have the most resonance in the latter model. It is a matter of some dispute regarding which model is ascendant in recent Supreme Court decisions.
97
Whichever model is deemed superior, the excessive filing of SG amicus briefs outlined here goes beyond the bounds of either model.
98
The dangers of excessive politicization and disruption of the adversarial process might be said to attend the filing of any amicus brief by the SG. But those costs are tolerable or perhaps unavoidable when the SG is asserting a strong and direct federal interest. The costs loom larger when the federal interest asserted by the SG is attenuated. Put another way, amicus briefs should supplement, rather than drive or overwhelm, the normal litigation 94. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 38, at 861-62. Professors Devins and Prakash observe that while "[e]xpertise has its rightful advantages," if the Court routinely and openly seeking advice from the "Chamber of Commerce in business cases or the ACLU in First Amendment cases," would raise troubling questions, then so should "the obvious and outsized influence that the solicitor general wields upon the Court." Id. at 885 (footnote omitted).
95 process. 99 And there is no strong reason why the SG's amicus briefs should be an exception to that principle. The process can become unseemly when private parties openly lobby the SG to file amicus briefs in their favor, 100 or when the Court sometimes seems to excessively rely on such briefs unfiltered by the adversarial process.
101 Indeed, so many amicus briefs are now filed that they should more than compensate for the small number of cases where the SG should forebear in filing the briefs.
E. Direct Federal Interests as a Predicate for the Solicitor General's Amicus Briefs
The costs of excessive amicus briefs by the SG do not call for a radical reworking of the SG's amicus practice. Rather, only relatively mild changes to the SG's practice are necessary, which would likely result in a slight diminution of cases in which the SG files amicus briefs. The focal point should be a more modest conception of the "interests of the United States" that are, or should be, necessarily present for the SG to seriously consider filing a brief. Defining the term will largely depend on the expansiveness of the role or roles that the SG should adopt for the office. 102 Calling for a more modest conception of "federal interests" in this regard necessarily 101. See Gorod, supra note 16, at 37 (excessive reliance on amicus briefs for extra-record fact-finding is difficult to square with the Court's "purported commitment to an adversarial system of justice."); Haw, supra note 12, at 1248-49 (arguing that the Court's excessive reliance on arguments advanced in amicus briefs in antitrust cases moves process away from traditional Article III cases and towards administrative law-like rulemaking); see generally Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) (arguing that the Court routinely relies in its opinions on facts not found in the record or briefs (including amicus briefs), and arguing that such "in-house" fact-finding should be curtailed or augmented by public participation).
102. Strauss, supra note 57, at 170-71 (discussing roles of the SG in conjunction with the filing of amicus briefs). calls for addressing the proper role of the SG. As discussed earlier, 103 different models of the appropriate role of the SG affects the expansiveness of the SG's amicus practice. A definitive selection of the appropriate model(s) for all aspects of the SG's work (notably, when the SG represents the United States as a party) is unnecessary for purposes of this article. Rather, the view advanced here is that the costs outlined in the prior section argue in favor of a more limited role for the SG as amicus, no matter the role a particular SG purports to follows. That limited role is framed by the requirement that there should be a direct federal interest in a case before the SG considers filing an amicus brief. Typically, such a federal interest should focus primarily on how litigation to which the United States is not a party will nonetheless affect and impact the enforcement of federal law by the executive branch.
Prior practice can be the guide to cabin the scope of a federal interest. Consider first Rex Lee's first category of direct federal interests. He argued that such cases were typically ones where the case could have an impact on the executive branch's enforcement or application of federal law. 104 This category is appropriate, if understood to mean that the case will or may have a perceptible effect on the enforcement of federal law by some part of the executive branch, or where there has been a tradition of expertise centered in the executive branch (e.g., foreign affairs). It is not simply some amorphous and diluted federal interest but one based in the executive branch, which the SG represents. Congress, the other non-judicial branch of the federal government, might have its own interests in cases, and it should more frequently file its own amicus briefs, rather than have that role fully captured by the SG. 105 employment discrimination cases, 106 since the EEOC and other agencies are statutorily authorized to enforce many employment discrimination laws. But the federal government can also be sued under these laws, and whatever side the SG supports in a given case can place the government in a conflictof-interest like dilemma. 107 Given that tension, the SG was appropriately reticent in filing an amicus brief in Wal-Mart, and should be so in other cases involving statutes where the federal government can sue or be sued.
Consider, too, Lee's second category, those cases advancing the broader social agenda of an administration. Efforts to define a federal interest in those cases have largely been unconvincing, as was Lee's unelaborated suggestion that the Justices should officially know the President's position in cases involving important social issues. 108 Well, why? It seems little more than an overt effort to advance the political agenda of the administration and, indeed, to overtly exert political pressure on the Court. Some who argue that the Court historically does or should follow public opinion, broadly defined, would presumably have little trouble with and might even applaud such efforts, since they might provide useful signals of information to the Court in that regard. 109 , Feb. 17, 2011 , at A18 (urging the SG to file an amicus brief in favor of Wal-Mart or remain silent). I am not arguing for a bright-line rule against the SG filing briefs in a case involving causes of action that might be brought against the federal government, only that the SG should give pause before appearing as amicus. The highly unusual facts of WalMart, involving a proposed nationwide class action of several million, suggests that an SG appearance was inappropriate. To be sure, it is unlikely that employees of the United States would bring such an action, and that might reduce the potential for a conflict of interest posited in the text. But several reasons suggest why the SG did not file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court. The EEOC's brief in the lower courts only dealt with the issue of punitive damages; the Supreme Court did not CVSG; it was not clear how the sociological evidence advanced by the plaintiffs (on the class action requirement of commonality) might be useful or applied in other cases; and the EEOC might have thought it best to stay out if it contemplated suing Wal-Mart (or similarly situated employers) in subsequent actions. sent by the President and his SG in such briefs, as it could lead to the perception that the briefs are (and perhaps should be) the proximate cause of the Court's decision. One need not be oblivious to Legal Realism to conclude that the SG should also be reticent in filing briefs in the "social agenda" cases, in the absence of an articulable federal interest. Thus, the filing of briefs in such cases should be relatively rare events and not done as a matter of course.
As illustrations of the application of this more modest agenda for the SG, consider some past and present SG amicus briefs in high-profile social agenda cases. The SGs of two administrations filed amicus briefs in Brown v. Board of Education, and the brief, supporting the plaintiffs, is often credited with persuading the Court to hold that public school desegregation was unconstitutional. 110 The federal government had been grappling with racial desegregation of the military, and desegregation of other public institutions was on the national agenda at the time. But what precisely was the federal interest in this particular litigation, since local state schools were involved? Given that at the time the executive branch had little statutory authority to enforce civil rights in general, there was "little federal institutional interest in a ruling against segregation," 111 at least in this context. It is thus difficult to contest David Strauss' conclusion that the SG's amicus brief in Brown was instead "the result of a moral commitment and a political calculation."
112 Better grounds to support the SG's filing in the case are the arguments in the brief concerning the deleterious effects on America's foreign policy during the Cold War by the continuing practice of public racial segregation, even at the local level.
113 The SG's concern with foreign policy is a distinct federal interest that justifies the filing of an amicus brief.
There was also the SG's amicus brief in Baker v. Carr, which is likewise credited with aiding the Court in reaching the conclusion that reapportionment cases, challenging the drawing of state legislative district boundaries, could be brought in federal court. 114 Here, again, the federal interest was not clear. 115 The SG argued that there was federal interest in the integrity of the election process and advancing the right to an equal vote. But it is not difficult to conclude that the SG was advancing the broader policy agenda of the Kennedy administration, and indeed many observed, then and now, that urban voters were likely to benefit from the litigation and were more likely to vote Democratic. 117 In these circumstances, the SG should not have filed amicus briefs in Baker and subsequent reapportionment cases.
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Finally, consider the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of state restrictions on same-sex marriage. Given the concurrent litigation on federal restrictions on same-sex marriage (not to mention President Obama's public support for such marriages announced in the spring of 2012), it might have seemed a foregone conclusion that the SG would file an amicus brief when it reached the Supreme Court. Perhaps that is true, but the Hollingsworth v. Perry litigation 119 was not an appropriate vehicle for the SG to file a brief. The case did not involve a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Rather, it concerned the much narrower issue of whether a referendum can reverse a decision of the state supreme court that held there was such a right under the state constitution.
120 That indeed is an issue of federal constitutional law, but it is one with little if any institutional 117. Id. at 1121, 1135. Still, it was hardly clear that most urban voters would automatically support the Democratic party, given the wide demographic variation of urban residents in the United States (then and now).
118. In contrast, in later cases involving the Voting Rights Act of 1965, some of which also involved reapportionment issues, the SG was justified in filing amicus briefs, since the Act empowered the Justice Department to enforce certain aspects of the law. Id. at 1128-29. In more recent election law cases challenging the constitutionality of state laws regulating campaign financing, the SG has filed amicus briefs arguing that the resolution of those cases will affect the legality of similar federal laws. Id. at 1126-28. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2, Ariz. Free Enter. Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 , 2011 WL 639369, at *1-2. For that reason, it is perhaps surprising that given the considerable controversy (including criticism by President Obama) surrounding Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010) (striking down federal limits on independent campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions), in which the United States was a party, the SG did not file an amicus brief in the subsequent case of Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 , 2491 (per curiam) , which addressed similar issues arising in a challenge to a state law.
119. See supra note 11. 120. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 , 1064 , 1076 (9th Cir. 2012 ) (discussing narrowness of the issues raised by the case), vacated by Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 interest of the executive branch. 121 In those circumstances, the SG should not have filed an amicus brief.
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F. Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference
Whether the SG should file amicus briefs is related to the issue of what deference, if any, the Court should give such briefs, the subject of the next Part of the article. If the SG is filing amicus briefs in areas where I argue there is limited federal interest, it suggests that the SG's expertise is attenuated and the Court should for that reason not give such a brief any particular deference. The inquiries are not identical, because even under my suggested analysis for the filing of briefs, the Court should not necessarily defer as such to the briefs, even when appropriately filed. Likewise, even if my analysis suggesting a more modest role for SG amicus filings is not followed, there remains the analytical question of deference.
Another way to approach the linkage of activism and deference is to consider the roles of the respective institutional actors. So far, I have focused on the SG's office. But if the Court itself becomes concerned with the proliferation of amicus filings, by the SG or anyone else, it possesses tools to restrain or channel that growth. For example, rather than the relative freedom in which the SG and other entities are permitted to file the briefs, it could create more formidable hurdles to the filing of the briefs.
123 Similarly, 121. Much of the Perry litigation concerned the application of the somewhat similar case of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) , involving a referendum which added a provision to the Colorado state constitution, limiting the ability of that state to protect the rights of homosexuals. There seems little if any federal interest in the outcome of that suit, and the SG was correct in not filing an amicus brief in the case. The same conclusion follows in the Perry litigation.
122. The SG's amicus brief in Hollingsworth does not give convincing reasons why it was filed. It states that the United States has an interest given the parallel litigation in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2652 , involving the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. It also states that the President and Attorney General have determined that sexual orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny, and that the United States "has participated as amicus curiae in other cases to address the level of scrutiny to be applied to a particular classification for equal protection purposes." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 , 2013 WL 769326, at *1-2. Taken alone or together, these reasons do not implicate any interest peculiar to the enforcement of federal law by the executive branch. Instead, it is the SG advancing the policy agenda of the President, which this article argues is not enough to justify the SG filing an amicus brief.
123. For example, the Court could require that all prospective amicus filers receive permission from the Court, and it could more rigorously insist that the SG and other potential amici have an interest. Once filed, the Court could also institute procedures that lessen the influence of all amicus briefs filed outside the adversarial process. See supra note 99 (discussing such steps). Among other things, the Court could consider permitting the parties to file briefs in response to those filed by amici. Finally, the Court could consider curtailing or even eliminating the Court could be clearer on the deference it sometimes purports to give such briefs, particularly by the SG. If it limits the topics on which it will give explicit deference to the SG's views as amicus, as I argue, the SG will presumably have fewer incentives to file such briefs.
III.
THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINAL DEFERENCE TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS AMICUS The SG's amicus briefs have been considered highly influential on the Supreme Court, as measured by such factors as congruence of Court decisions with the position recommended by the SG, or by the citation of the briefs in Court opinions. Influence can be overstated; correlation is not causation, and a few spare citations to an amicus brief by the Court should not without more be invested with great significance. But the SG can also affect the development of doctrine by the Court, as revealed by the substantive content of the Court's opinions. There are case studies of how the SG's brief was used by the Court, or individual Justices, as authority to shape a particular opinion or a body of law.
124 However, little scholarly attention has been devoted to considering in a more systematic way those occasions when the Court gives express deference in its opinions to the position advanced by the SG as amicus, 125 or when the Court should give its use of the CVSG process, which has quietly bestowed considerable influence on the SG. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 38, at 885-86 (arguing that the CVSG process is unconstitutional, since when the Court seeks legal advice from nonparties, it goes outside the proper bounds of Article III). Any of these steps are not cost-free, as all would entail considerable work by the Court itself, to screen the briefs or to take steps to acquire the information typically provided by amicus briefs. For these reasons, the Court will likely be reluctant to change the status quo. 124. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 91, at 376-77 (discussing influence of amicus briefs in Grutter v. Bollinger).
125. The otherwise considerable literature on the Court's deference to the positions of the executive branch usually does not differentiate between the United States as a party in a case, as opposed to appearing as an amicus, or as opposed to neither. See, e.g REV. 1727 REV. , 1729 REV. -34 (2010 (discussing deference the Court should give to rules issued by the EEOC, in case where the EEOC did not participate as party or amicus). The present article more explicitly focuses on the deference, if any, due the United States as an amicus.
deference to those briefs. 126 This part of the article preliminarily undertakes that task, with a particular focus on decisions from the recent Terms which refer to the SG's amicus briefs.
A. The Court's Continuum of Deference to the Solicitor General's Amicus Briefs
By any conventional measure, Supreme Court decision making and the content of its opinions have been influenced by the SG's amicus briefs. The Court can be considered deferential to or influenced by the SG's amicus briefs, even when they are not cited, as in Brown and Baker v. Carr. Influence can also be reflected in deference that the opinions give to the SG's amicus briefs. But in the latter cases, the Court has not been a model of clarity when it comes to such deference. Sometimes the Court will explicitly state it is giving deference to the SG's amicus brief. At other times the brief will be cited but does not appear to have been particularly influential, and on still other occasions the Court will expressly disagree with, or note a lack of deference to, the SG's amicus brief.
First, consider some examples of express deference by the Court as a whole or by individual Justices. Deference can be revealed by use of that word or similar language showing heightened considerations for the views of the United States. 127 Particularly noteworthy examples of such deference are in cases dealing with foreign affairs, such as the interpretation of a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, 128 or the scope of a private action against foreigners that involves the interpretation of a federal statute. 129 126. For a similar effort to address when, if ever, the Court should doctrinally give deference to the views expressed in the amicus briefs by state attorneys general, often jointly filed in federalism cases, see Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 358 (2012) .
127. I use "deference" for convenience, conceding that neither courts nor the scholarly literature uses the term with precision. As Peter Strauss has observed, "'deference' is a highly variable, if not empty, concept. It is sometimes used in the sense of 'obey' or 'accept,' and sometimes as 'respectfully consider.'" Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight", 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 , 1145 . See also Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403-04 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing difficulty in precisely measuring the degree of deference under Chevron, Skidmore and other cases).
128. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 , 1993 (2010 (declaring that executive branch's views on interpretation of treaties are entitled to "great weight"); Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagiano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (same).
129. E.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 , 2283 & n.3 (2010 (private suits under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) could not be filed against foreign governmental officials). Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004) (in recognizing "new private causes of action for violating international law," courts should be "particularly wary of Others are cases involving state-law based causes of action, where defendants claim that federal statutes or regulations issued by federal agencies preempt the cause of action. 130 Still other examples are cases involving actions by private parties under federal law, where the Department of Justice or agencies of the executive branch are statutorily empowered to bring suit to enforce the statutes. 131 A second set of cases are those that don't cite the SG's amicus brief at all, or cite it in a non-deferential way, seemingly treating it like any other amicus brief that might be filed. While the SG's amicus briefs as a whole are cited far more often than other amicus briefs, there is a significant fraction of cases where there is no citation, or even when cited, no particular deference is afforded the brief. Indeed, the majority of cases where the SG filed an amicus brief can be safely said to fall into this category. 132 A third set of cases are those where the Court, or individual Justices, seem to go out of the way to not show deference, or expressly disagree with the position of the SG as amicus. 133 To be sure, these latter occasions might be regarded as a form of deference; the Court is taking the courtesy, one might say, of explaining why it disagrees with the SG, rather than being silent as it is of course entitled to do.
134 Confusingly, some of these antideference cases are those involving foreign affairs 135 or other categories 136 where the Court has otherwise expressly given deference to the SG.
B. Why Defer?
The Court has not articulated a general theory of why the SG's amicus brief is due some level of deference at all, or at least in some circumstances, but not in other seemingly similar circumstances. Perhaps this is nothing more than the well-known proclivity of the Court to modulate deference, even when the United States is a party to the suit.
137 But as argued in Part II, the Court should not so easily equate the position of the United States (or 133. E.g., Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 , 1078 -81 (2013 ; Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 732-33 (2013) ; Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 , 2824 ). 134. See Ruth Colker, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Friends, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 516, 531, 536-38 (2007 (suggesting this as an explanation for when Justice O'Connor would cite but nonetheless disagree with the SG's amicus brief).
135. E.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 , 2886 -88 (2010 (entire subsection of majority opinion devoted to refuting position of SEC on proper extraterritorial scope of the federal securities laws); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (in a case involving the FSIA, " [w] hile the United States' views [as expressed via an amicus brief, on an issue of statutory interpretation] are of considerable interest to the Court, they merit no special deference."); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (disagreeing with SG as amicus on whether treaty preempted state statute, since resolution of that issue should not "vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department"); Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 , 2007 (2010 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that reason for giving "great weight" to the government's interpretation of treaties was not clear, and discounting the SG's amicus position on interpretation of a treaty in part because it was "possibly inconsistent" with the government's previous position). 136. E.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 , 2575 n.3 (2011 ("Although we defer to the agency's interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an agency's ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be pre-empted."); Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 , 2303 n.8 (2011 S. 167, 210 n.3 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discounting weight to be given SG amicus brief regarding standing of private party to enforce environmental laws, since there was not a "long and uninterrupted history of Presidential acquiescence and approval," but rather was simply "approval by a single administration"); Solimine, supra note 37, at 1127 n.97.
137. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 125, at 1099 (chart outlining different levels of deference used by the Court).
any amicus) with that of a party. The deference, if any, due amicus briefs is entitled to separate, if ultimately related, analysis.
Two related arguments, drawn from federal courts doctrine and administrative law, suggest that SG amicus briefs are indeed entitled to deference, at least under some circumstances, beyond that accorded any other amicus filing. One argument is the venerable political question doctrine, where the Court has stated that it will not decide cases that raise "political questions," which it has variously defined as those where there is a "textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicial discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."
138 One prominent area that has sometimes qualified as a nonjusticiable political question has been cases involving foreign relations or the war-making power of the executive branch, 139 though even here the Court has been careful to not abandon the field. 140 The argument here is by analogy, since successful invocation of the political question doctrine results in a court dismissing the case; in contrast, I argue that successful invocation of the doctrine can result in the Court expressly deferring to the views of the SG as amicus.
The other argument draws on cases where federal courts give deference to the interpretation of federal law by federal administrative agencies. The lodestar case here is Chevron U.S. A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 141 which held that federal courts should defer to an agency's permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the agency has been statutorily charged with administering the statute.
142 Chevron deference is predicated on both formalist and functional considerations, positing that when Congress leaves open gaps in statutes for agencies to fill, unelected federal judges should defer to the policy choices of other branches of government that are more expert and more accountable.
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Deference to the government under the political question or Chevron doctrines can take place either when the government is a party, or when it 138. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 , 1427 ) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962 appears as an amicus. 144 Indeed, recent studies suggest that up to one-third of Supreme Court decisions concerning Chevron deference involve cases where the SG appears as amicus. 145 The argument for deference to the SG as amicus is, again, by analogy, since I am not suggesting that these doctrines should apply in full force, as they do when the government is a party to the suit. To treat the status of the SG when representing a party or simply appearing as an amicus as irrelevant raises the costs from politicization and harm to the adversarial process of freely filing such briefs outlined in Part II of this article. Put bluntly, the SG and the United States should not automatically gain the benefit of Chevron-like deference when it is not a party to the litigation.
Nonetheless, the rationales for deference provide a firmer jurisprudential basis for the assertion that the SG's amicus briefs should be afforded deference, not simply on the bald political basis that the President desires some result in a case in which the United States is not a party. These doctrines also provide a basis for calibrating deference. If the case involves an issue where the government as a party is typically afforded deference, then that should typically also follow when the SG appears as amicus. Rather than the near-mandatory deference of Chevron, however, the Court should evaluate the amicus brief under so-called Skidmore deference for the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade." 146 In contrast, if the SG files an amicus 144. As previously noted, deference can also take place when the United States is neither party nor amicus. Bradley, supra note 125, at 681. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2005) , involved extensive discussion of how much Chevron deference, if any, should be afforded EEOC regulations where the EEOC did not appear as a party or amicus. A concurring opinion appeared to be more willing to give Chevron deference in such situations when the agency had previously, in other litigation, appeared as an amicus to advance and defend its views of the statute. Id. at 244 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) ). As Christopher illustrates, the decision to give deference may not always be sharply different from an evaluation of the persuasiveness of the arguments advanced in a SG amicus brief. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169. In Christopher, in determining whether agency's interpretation of its own regulations, brought to the Court's attention in a SG amicus brief, the Court relied on such factors as where the interpretation was inconsistent with the regulation; when the agency did not give fair and considered judgment to the matter; and when the agency interpretation conflicted with an earlier brief in a case where the government is typically not afforded deference, the Court should in turn not do so. In those circumstances, the Court should only give the SG's amicus brief such weight as it might find persuasive, like it would do with any other brief.
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C.
Optimal Deference
Existing deference doctrines and the Court's own practice, inconsistent though it is, on giving weight to SG amicus briefs, suggest several types of cases where some level of deference may be appropriate for the SG's amicus brief, beyond that accorded any other given amicus. In what is not meant to be an exhaustive survey, some of these areas are explored below.
Foreign Relations
Drawing on the political question doctrine, the Court has frequently given deference to the government's views, as expressed by the SG in an amicus brief, to cases involving or impacting the foreign relations of the United States. These cases include such varied matters as the interpretation of treaties, 148 private suits against foreign entities, 149 and the preemption of state laws dealing with the actions of foreign countries. 150 The deference is attributed to the unique responsibilities and expertise of the executive branch regarding the conduct of foreign relations, which most agree exceeds that of the institutional capabilities of the federal courts. 151 interpretation. Id. at 2166. Having decided that deference to the agency position was not due, the Court proceeded to determine whether the agency position was "persuasive in its own right," id. at 2170, based on Skidmore factors. Id. at 2167-68. See also Decker v. Nw. Env't. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 , 1337 -38 (2013 153 There, the Court held that the federal securities laws had no extraterritorial effect, in a private action by foreign plaintiffs against American and foreign defendants, for misconduct on securities traded on foreign exchanges. 154 In the course of reaching that result, the Court (per Justice Antonin Scalia) spent a subsection of the opinion rejecting the position of the SG as amicus. 155 The Court said the SG's brief was not entitled to deference, since the SG's proposed test to determine extraterritorial effect lacked "textual support" in the statutes; that the policy reasons advanced by the SG were not convincing on their own terms or had no basis in Congressional action; and that the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission, advanced by the SG, was not reasonable, since it was based on erroneous readings of earlier cases.
156
Morrison should not be read for the proposition that the Court was rejecting a long-standing deference to the SG as amicus in cases with foreign relations implications. A full discussion of that case, and an exploration of whether the majority was correct in rejecting the SG's arguments, is beyond the scope of this article. But the Court's opinion usefully illustrates the proper approach to considering the SG's amicus brief on a topic where deference is usually afforded. The opinion took the SG's brief seriously and discussed at length the reasons for its disagreement with the positions advanced by the SG.
157 This is preferential to the extremes of the Court simply ignoring the brief 158 or giving it a passing reference, or giving mandatory, Chevron-like deference to the SG's position.
152. See cases cited supra note 135 for earlier examples. 153. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010 ). 154. Id. at 2887 -88. 155. Id. at 2886 . Id. Interestingly, the concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, who disagreed at length with the majority's analysis but nonetheless concurred in the result, makes only a passing, nondeferential reference to the SG's amicus brief. Id. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157. See generally Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886-88. For another example in the foreign relations context of an opinion carefully discussing why it was not giving weight to the SG's amicus brief, see Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 , 2007 -08 (2010 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (arguing that SG's amicus brief, presenting the position of the State Department, was not entitled to weight, since it was "newly memorialized," was "possibly inconsistent" with the Department's prior interpretation, and the "Executive's understanding of the treaty's drafting history [was not] particularly rich or illuminating").
158. For two recent examples, see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 , 1662 (interpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 , 1021 (interpreting a treaty).
Morrison also illustrates that the genre of foreign relations cases is itself a complex one, and deference, however expressed, to the SG as amicus will and should depend in part on the precise nature of the issue presented. Much can depend, for example, on how, if at all, Congress has statutorily addressed an issue, or delegated the resolution of an issue to the Executive, or if the President is relying on his independent lawmaking powers. 159 Thus, for interpretation of treaties, the Court can justify deference to the SG's amicus views since the Executive, presumably, has the best information (not all of it public) regarding how the treaty was negotiated, the impact of its implementation, and the need for consistency among its signatories in its meaning. 160 In contrast, the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes, as in Morrison, present relatively ordinary issues of statutory interpretation. The Executive, as party or amicus, possesses no special authority on that topic and thus no particular deference is due.
Congressional Delegation to the Executive: Private Enforcement of Federal Law, and Preemption
A second set of cases where the Court has at least sometimes expressed some level of deference draws on the Chevron model, since it is more explicitly premised on Congressional delegation to the executive branch of authority to enforce federal law. Consider first situations where Congress has statutorily lodged authority in the executive branch or agencies to enforce federal law by rulemaking or litigation. In its opinions, the Court sometimes purports to give deference to the SG's amicus briefs in cases where private parties are attempting to enforce these laws via litigation. 161 But one can easily find counterexamples in such suits where the Court gives no such deference. 162 The SG has frequently claimed that the United States has an interest in these cases since the executive branch has authority to enforce these laws, and expansion or limitation on private enforcement necessarily affects how the Executive will act. 163 One might argue that the Executive is well equipped to balance the costs and benefits of private enforcement, as opposed to the courts, and that Chevron deference, or something close to it, would be appropriate for the SG's views, via amicus or otherwise, on these matters. 164 It is true that the Constitution requires the President to faithfully execute the laws, 165 and Congress has expressly empowered the executive to enforce these laws, and the practical experience of the government, as expressed by the SG, should be of interest to the Court. But the interest of the government is typically not so strong as to justify explicit deference. The frequently-stated interest, that the executive also enforces these laws, is conclusory and question begging. The issues of deciding the scope of an express private right of action, or implying a private right of action, are ultimately ones of statutory interpretation, and the executive branch or the SG has no special purchase on the resolution of those issues.
Particularly instructive in this regard are the line of cases where the Court has grappled with implying rights of action. When the Court directly addressed these issues starting in the 1960s, it was prone to imply private rights of action, as a necessary adjunct, as it saw it, to the limited enforcement resources of the executive branch. Later, the Court retreated and held that implying rights of action are simply issues of statutory interpretation, and that resolution of those cases should not turn on the preferred policy preferences for expanding or limiting private remedies.
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In a parallel fashion, the Court initially appeared to give significant weight to the views of the SG, as party or amicus, in the implication of private actions, but later discounted the views of the SG in this regard. 167. In the case credited with jump-starting the implication of private remedies, the SG, for the SEC, had filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 427 (1964) . The Court observed that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action," and that the SEC "advises [presumably referring to the amicus brief] that it examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be expedited." Id. at 432. As late as 1979, a majority of the Court was giving significant attention to the views of the enforcing agency expressed by the SG when the United States was a party, or as amicus, to the necessary use of implied private remedies. E.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707-08 & n.42 (1979) . Cannon was the high-water mark for the implication of private remedies, and soon thereafter the Court began to frame the inquiry as The Court is right to have become skeptical of giving dispositive weight to the views of the executive branch in these cases. If statutory interpretation is the touchstone, one must acknowledge that the statutes (like many statutes) are products of compromise, and the result of a compromise may have been not to provide for private enforcement, or limit the scope of private remedies that were created. 168 Moreover, private remedies may lead to the over enforcement of federal law, or disrupt the centralized and uniform enforcement of federal law by the executive branch. 169 Furthermore, public choice theory suggests that federal agencies may be subject to capture by interest groups regarding the existence or scope of private enforcement of federal law. 170 Whether one agrees or disagrees with these critiques, the SG has no monopoly on the proper way to balance the virtues or vices of private enforcement. The Court, then, should consider but not give express deference to the views of the United States as party or amicus on these issues.
Another, related area where the Court has sent mixed signals is preemption of state law by federal law. Sometimes the Court gives deference to the views of the SG, typically as amicus, 171 and sometimes not. 172 The divergence in statements by the Court seems to be largely a function of the overall lack of clarity in current doctrine about the level of deference that should be given an agency's opinion about the resolution of that conflict. 173 There is similarly a robust scholarly debate on whether and to what extent deference is due agencies in this regard. 174 A full recounting of the debate is unnecessary here. The views of the SG can diverge from those of the agency it represents as party or amicus in the Court, 175 but the Court's deference (or lack thereof) to the SG in preemption cases seems entirely a function of its views of the issues and the agency involved. The presence of the SG as such is apparently given no independent weight on the level of deference.
176 Indeed, the institutional features of the SG, advantageous though they are in general, do not match those of the agencies themselves.
177 So, again, however this aspect of the preemption debate is resolved, it seems inappropriate to give the SG's amicus briefs special deference simply by virtue of the brief being the conduit of the position of the agency.
Changing Interpretations by the Solicitor General
Another reason that some Court opinions have given for not deferring to the SG amicus briefs is one of timing. The argument is that formally the SG speaks for one person and one presidential administration. The position taken by the brief may differ from past administrations, and even if it doesn't, it does not bind future ones.
178 It seems to follow that the SG's amicus briefs should have no higher status than the briefs of any party or any other amicus, and hence while they may be persuasive, should not be entitled to any particular deference. Indeed, a stronger version of this line of argument would discount all SG amicus briefs, since all are products of one SG, whether or not there is inconsistency with the position taken by a previous SG.
Principles of administrative law provide a path to approach if not necessarily resolve this problem. Chevron and its progeny provide that 175. Lemos, supra note 33, [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] (arguing that few of the features that justify deference to the views of an agency, such as specialized expertise, transparency, and public access, are replicated in the SG's office). In short, Lemos argues that the SG "injects a legalistic, court-centered perspective into agency decisionmaking, filtering agency arguments through a quasi-judicial screen so as to prepare them for presentation to the Court. That process . . . can operate to leech out many of the characteristics of agency decisionmaking typically thought most valuable." Id. at 205.
178. For examples, see several of the cases cited supra notes 135-36.
deference by courts to changed agency interpretations is permissible to preserve administrative flexibility, so long as the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is a reasonable one. 179 Rather than suggesting a bright-line rule must be employed to gauge the effect of inconsistent positions by the SG regarding deference, Chevron teaches that apparent inconsistency is only one factor, among several, that a court should consider when deciding whether to defer. Recall that it was earlier argued that strict administrative law deference principles should only apply by analogy to the SG's amicus briefs. Flexible, rather than mandatory deference should apply, meaning the Court should examine the arguments presented in the brief, and take into account (among other things) any changed positions by different SGs.
180
In particular, the Court should take into account the reasons (if any) presented by the SG for a change in positions. These reasons might include simple disagreement with the position taken by a previous SG, or the consideration of new empirical evidence or the development of new policy strategies by the SG or an agency involved. 181 The latter reasons should be more convincing to justify continuing to give some deference, assuming it is appropriate to give deference in the first place. It will not always be easy for the Court (or, indeed, the SG) to tease out these reasons. Presumably the SG will not be eager to concede that a different position exists at all, much less that is based on an unabashed change in political considerations. 182 But a more nuanced approach to a change in positions by the SG is preferable to the too-strong medicine of simply discounting all SG amicus briefs on the basis that the positions taken reflect the views of only one administration, as opposed to the institutional interests of the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is widely recognized that the Solicitor General, and the attorneys in the SG's office, have enjoyed an extraordinarily high success rate in the Supreme Court, whether representing the United States as a party, or as an amicus curiae. This success is currently accentuated by the historically low docket of the current Court, which means that the SG typically participates as a party or amicus in about three-fourths of the approximately 80 cases the Court decides on the merits each Term. In its opinions, the Court frequently cites, relies on, and sometimes gives explicit deference to, the amicus briefs filed by the SG.
What has been less discussed, on the Court itself or in the scholarly literature, is whether this state of affairs is to be applauded or questioned. This article has undertaken that task. The SG and the attorneys in the SG's office are rightly regarded as extraordinary skilled lawyers, who over decades have earned high accolades and respect among judges and the legal community at large. One can reach that conclusion without agreeing with everything the SG does. Regarding the frequency of the SG filing amicus briefs, I conclude that in general the SG, over many presidential administrations, has had an unjustifiably expansive understanding of the "interests of the United States," which has led the SG to file too many amicus briefs. While difficult to precisely define, that term should be restricted to cases where there is palpable effect on the operations of the executive branch, as opposed to a more general interest by the President or the SG, based on political considerations or otherwise, in the outcome of a suit where the United States is not a party. Avoiding the politicization of the SG's office, and the distortion of the traditional adversarial process, supports modest restraints on the SG's existing amicus filing practice.
That the Court is influenced by the SG's amicus briefs is undeniable and justifiable. What is less clear is the level of deference the Court sometimes gives in its opinions to the positions advanced by the SG as amicus. Of course, when the SG represents the government as a party, the Court is free to give as much or as little deference to the arguments advanced by the different administrations should follow stare decisis in its legal opinions, see Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 , 1448 (2010 government. It is less clear that any deference is justifiable when the government is not a party and only appears as an amicus. Drawing on federal courts and administrative law principles, I argue that deference is sometimes appropriate in these circumstances. While a full exploration of those instances is beyond this article, I suggest some factors that can inform the Court's decisions to purport to give deference to the SG. Even when deference is not appropriate, the Court can give weight as it sees fit to any particular amicus brief filed by the SG. These arguments, too, would work no radical change in the Court's decision making and drafting of opinions, but would place both on a more coherent basis.
